A Metaphysical Grounding Account of Knowledge.
John sees his coworker Nogot driving a Ford. By this evidence he forms a belief of the proposition p, ‘someone in the office owns a Ford.’ It so happens that Nogot is renting the car, but a different person in the office, Smith, does own a Ford. So it seems as though p is true and John has a justified belief in p, ergo it should be the case that John knows p. But it seems obvious that he does not.
In the following I will offer an account of knowledge that coincides with our intuitions as to its nature, explains the seeming contradiction of Gettier cases, and allows knowledge despite the skeptical paradox. I will first lay out my theory, then illustrate how it resolves the cases associated with Gettier and skepticism, and finally I will rebuke some potential objections.
Theory
My claim as to when S is sufficiently justified in her belief of p as to know p is as follows.
Grounding Theory of Justification (GT)
S knows p iff S believes p in virtue of being aware of some evidence whose existence is grounded in p’s truth.
When I say that the evidences existence is grounded in p’s truth I mean that the evidence only exists because p is true.
GETTIER
The Nogot case is resolved via GT because John witnessed Nogot driving a Ford he did not own, and therefore could have witnessed Nogot driving that Ford regardless of whether anyone in the office owned a Ford or not. The evidence wasn’t grounded in the proposition that someone in the office owns a ford. That someone does happen to own a Ford is just an irrelevant coincidence.
Consider the alternate scenario where John sees Smith pull up in his Ford and forms the belief that someone in the office owns a Ford. John did witness Smith driving his own Ford, which is evidence grounded in p’s truth. So, in this example, since John’s evidence for believing p, where p is the belief that someone in the office owns a Ford, is grounded in it being true that someone in the office owns a Ford, John knows p.
Consider another example. You are driving through the countryside and you see a barn. You form the belief, ‘there is a barn in that field.’ However barn façades have been put up all over the countryside. So even though you are looking at a real barn, it seems as though you have formed a true belief by luck, as it may have been the case that you saw a façade instead and formed the same belief.
But your evidence for the proposition p ‘there is a barn in that field,’ is that you are looking at a barn in that field. Had it not been a barn, but a façade, then obviously your belief would have been false, but that is irrelevant. Since you base your belief in p on the evidence of having seen an actual barn, and not a façade, you are sufficiently justified in your belief that there is a barn in that field for you to have knowledge that p. Were it the case that you formed the belief instead by looking at a barn façade than you would not have knowledge that p, regardless of whether p was true or not, because even if there were a barn elsewhere in the field it would be irrelevant. But because you form your belief on your perception of an actual barn, you know there is a barn in that field regardless of the irrelevant coincidence of nearby barn facades.
If that does not seem immediately intuitive consider the possibility you are instantaneously transported to a position in front of an actual barn, and form the belief ‘there is a barn in that field,’ and then are instantaneously transported back to your armchair. It does not seem like your knowledge of the proposition ‘there is a barn in that field’ should be in any way threatened by the existence of fake barns near-by.
Similar remarks hold for the mule/zebra case, the sheep case, the roommate case, and so on.
SKEPTICISM
Claims:
GT: S knows p iff S believes p in virtue of being aware of some evidence whose existence is grounded in p’s truth.
It is not the case that for S to know p S must know she knows p.
So, it is not necessary for S to know that she knows p to know p. Under GT this cashes out as the fact that S does not need to know the evidence she uses in justifying her belief in some proposition is indeed grounded in that proposition’s truth in order to know that proposition. It simply must be the case that it is.
The skeptic claims we have no knowledge because in order to have knowledge of any p, one must be certain that not-p is false. Since we cannot be certain not-p in regards to our sensorial experiences such as having hands, we can have no knowledge of any sensory perceptions.
This is false. It is enough for S to know p iff S comes to believe p based on evidence grounded in p’s truth. That is, given that S has evidence for p and that the evidence she has is metaphysically dependent on p being true, thereby entailing that p is indeed true, S knows p.
So, if the evidence S uses to form the belief p, where p is that she hands, is seeing her hands, then S knows p. If instead the evidence for is a simulation of hands or a deception causing her to see hands that arent’t there, S doesn’t know p/
The only way in which the skeptic can threaten knowledge in this manner is if they are successful in persuading S in coming to disbelieve p. If S is not so persuaded, and if her evidence is indeed grounded in p’s truth (that, e.g., is it isn’t the case that her evidence is the result of false sensorial input) then S is successful in knowing p. That is just to say that if the proposition S believes is true, and the evidence she uses is grounded in that truth, then S knows p.
OBJECTIONS
A) It might be argued that GT entails one cannot gain knowledge via testimony. This is not the case. Consider the following.
Sophia looks through a telescope and finds a heretofore unseen moon revolving around Venus. She makes careful observations and calculations and so on until she is confident enough in her observation to tell Cryshawnda that she knows there is a moon revolving around Venus. Furthermore had there not been a moon revolving around Venus the evidence Sophia bases her belief on could not have existed.
Cryshawnda believes Sophia, and it is true that this moon exists, and that if it did not exist then the evidence Sophia uses in justifying her claim of knowledge to Cryshawnda would not exist. Then the evidence that Cryshawnda uses to justify her belief, Sophia’s claim of this moon’s existence (that is grounded in evidence that is grounded in the moon’s existence), would not have existed unless the moon existed. Witness: Had Sophia been mistaken, and had some evidence that would have existed regardless of whether or not a moon existed, then she would not have knowledge of that moon’s existence. Furthermore had she imparted that claim onto Cryshawnda, she would not be imparting knowledge. It is just because Sophia is sufficiently justified in her claim, just because her evidence is grounded in the truth of the relevant proposition, that Cryshawnda comes to have knowledge of that claim.
B) Suppose a skeptical paradox of the following manner. The world is a computer program but is dependent on the actions of real world counterparts that influence their avatars in our world. So if you see a bird fly in this world, the simulation, it is just because a bird flies in the real world. Therefore when you witness a bird flying, it is true that a bird is flying, it seems you are justified in believing it, and furthermore that the bird flies is grounded in the fact a bird flies. But it still doesn’t seem like you know a bird flies.
In this example the bird simulation is in fact dependent on an actual bird flying, but the connection doesn’t seem necessary. Consider an analogous example. A barn façade in the field uses as its support an actual barn, via 2x4s connected from the actual barn to the back of the façade. Therefore if that actual barn were not there then the barn façade could not stand. That this is the case does not determine that the barn façade could not have stood without the actual barn, surely a different means of support could have been found. So our intuition that should you have seen the barn façade and came to believe “there’s a barn in that field,” you would fail to have knowledge of that proposition regardless of the existence of an actual barn is correct under GT. Similarly for the bird, that some simulation of a bird is in fact dependent on an actual bird does not entail that it is metaphysically necessary that the simulation is dependent on a real bird flying, for certainly the simulation could be recreated so as not to necessitate a real bird. So, since it is the case you could have seen a simulation of a bird flying without an actual bird flying, this does not pose a problem for GT.
C) This account makes it almost impossible for anyone to be sure that he or she has knowledge. In order to say “I know p” one must be able to say “I know my evidence for believing p is such that p must be the case for that evidence to exist.” But the skeptical paradox defeats that claim in nearly every case, and many more mundane examples defeat that claim in most other circumstances.
I believe this is the most serious problem for GT. If I say, “I know my name is Ben.” Than under this theory that can be taken to mean that I know that I have evidence for believing as such that could never be defeated. Furthermore I have evidence for that claim that could never be defeated, an so forth. So, the issue is twofold, one is that the criteria for having knowledge is too high in the first place and that it leads to an infinite regress of evidential support, a problem raised for any evidential account of knowledge or justification.
The first fold is really not an issue with GT at all. The problem of propriety regarding the assertion of knowledge is not the problem of defining knowledge. My claim is that an agent has knowledge when she believes a proposition as a result of becoming aware of evidence that could not have existed unless the proposition were true. So, if she makes a claim of knowledge such as “I have hands,” and does so because she sees her hands and in fact her hands exist and are hers, she is correct in her assertion. If she makes the same assertion because she sees hands at the end of arms but in fact both are simulations or some other such thing, she is incorrect in her assertion. It might be the case that she was justified in making the claim both times, neither time, or in just the first case. That is a matter of debate regarding the propriety of assertion, not regarding the nature of knowledge.
The infinite regress is a claim against GT itself, but not one with much weight. The idea that there must be higher order knowledge to have knowledge at all, that you must know you know to know, has been largely abandoned. I personally believe that whatever the criteria for possessing knowledge may be, I’m advocating GT but even if I am wrong, the possession of higher order knowledge will not be a part of it, just because of issues regarding infinite regress. GT says simply that when an agent believes a proposition due to an awareness of some evidence which could not have existed without that proposition being true than she has sufficient justification to know that proposition. It suffices that she believes her evidence is appropriately grounded in the truth of the proposition, that it is so grounded, and, consequently, the proposition is true.
CONCLUSION
The Grounding Theory of Knowledge provides an account that agrees with common intuition regarding what it is to have knowledge, i.e., when an agent believes a proposition because she is aware of some evidence that exists only because the proposition is true
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